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CRAFTING A CORPORATE ANALOGUE TO
CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
B. Graves Lee, Jr. *

ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC
represented a sea change in the world of corporate citizenship. Although the
decision dealt with campaign finance law, it has sparked significant discussion
of the concept of corporate personhood more broadly. Corporations have
increasingly taken advantage of legal rights previously reserved for
individuals. This Note argues that where corporations reap the benefits of
constitutional entitlements intended for individuals, they should suffer
consequences for malfeasance similar to those imposed on individuals who
engage in criminal conduct. Specifically, this Note advocates for limitations
on corporate electioneering as a collateral consequence of a corporation’s
criminal conviction, just as individuals may forfeit the right to vote following a
felony conviction. Such a reform would address common criticisms regarding
corporate criminal prosecutions’ lack of deterrent effect. It would also send
an important expressive message that corporations do not enjoy more
favorable treatment than individuals when facing criminal prosecutions.
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INTRODUCTION
“Corporations are people, my friend,” responded former Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney to a protestor’s shouts at a 2011 campaign event. 1
In a way, this was an uncontroversial statement. After all, corporations have
long enjoyed the legal status of personhood. However, the twenty-first century
has seen the notion of the corporation as a person aggressively advanced in new
directions.
Perhaps no single instance has done more to ingrain corporate personhood
in the popular conscience than the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United
v. FEC. 2 The Court struck down statutory limits on corporate electioneering
contributions on First Amendment grounds. In doing so, the Court sparked significant outcry and attracted criticism for facilitating the ability of corporations
to assert rights traditionally thought to be reserved for individuals. Since Citizens United, there have been numerous instances of corporations claiming rights
ostensibly meant for individuals in other contexts as well. 3
However, if corporations may reap the benefits of constitutional protections
for individuals, should they not also be subject to analogous consequences?
This Note proposes that, in the context of corporate crime, the answer is yes.
Specifically, the Note will argue that corporations convicted of a crime should
face limitations on political activity akin to individual felony disenfranchisement. The proposed reform would also force corporations to disclose electioneering information that would otherwise be discretionary to disclose. Corporate
criminal disenfranchisement would shore up the deterrent effect of corporate
prosecutions, addressing a common critique of such prosecutions. It would also
serve an expressive function, indicating that corporations may not opt into a different set of rules than individuals are subject to when facing criminal prosecution. Corporate criminal disenfranchisement may also be constructed in a way
that is consonant with the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence
post-Citizens United.
Part I of this Note first examines the underpinnings of corporate crime to
describe why society prosecutes corporations directly, as well as prominent criticisms of corporate criminal prosecutions. Part I also describes the historical
and constitutional status of collateral consequences of criminal convictions,
both for corporations and individuals. Part II discusses regulations of corporate
campaign finance before and after Citizens United before moving into a broader
1. Ashley Parker, ‘Corporations Are People,’ Romney Tells Iowa Hecklers Angry Over
His Tax Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/us/politics/
12romney.html.
2. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
3. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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discussion of the notion of corporate personhood. Part III lays out the proposed
reform—restrictions on electioneering flowing from a corporation’s criminal
conviction—before addressing counterarguments.
I. WHY AND HOW WE PROSECUTE CORPORATIONS:
HISTORY, JUSTIFICATIONS, AND CRITICISM
A. Theories of Corporate Criminal Prosecutions
The ability to bring criminal charges against a corporation directly, as opposed to the individuals making up the corporation, is a well-established tool
available to prosecutors in the United States. 4 Prosecutors have used this tool
for over a century, and the United States Supreme Court held the practice constitutional in 1909. 5 The doctrine arose as the corporate form became common
in American society. 6 Although prosecutors’ use of criminal corporate prosecutions has waxed and waned over time, 7 it remains a valid tactic for addressing
corporate wrongdoing.
A corporation may be criminally liable for acts of its employees or agents
committed within the scope of their employment or agency for the benefit of the
corporation. 8 When deciding whether the corporation had the requisite mental
state to incur criminal liability, the court will look to the mental state of the corporate employees or agents involved and impute that state to the corporation
itself. 9 Even when no individual employee or agent possesses the requisite
mental state, the court may consider employees’ or agents’ collective
knowledge to satisfy the mens rea requirement. 10 This criminal liability arises
separately from the corporation’s civil liability for the same act or acts and does
not preclude civil or administrative enforcement actions for the same acts. 11
As in the individual criminal context, the prosecution of corporations advances several societal goals. First, prosecutions deter. Ideally, they dissuade
other corporations from engaging in similar wrongdoing in the future. 12 Mone4. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319
(1996) (providing an overview of the doctrine surrounding corporate crime).
5. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–95 (1909) (rejecting the argument that a corporation cannot be held criminally liable).
6. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1482 (1996).
7. See, e.g., David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal
Prosecution, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235 (2016) [hereinafter Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings]
(discussing the shift from corporate criminal prosecutions to deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements during the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations).
8. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 212 U.S. at 494.
9. See United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987).
10. Id.
11. See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 4, at 321.
12. See Khanna, supra note 6, at 1495.
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tary penalties may steer prospective corporate wrongdoers away from the temptation to break the law. Courts may also require structural reforms within a corporation following a criminal conviction. 13 This too can add deterrent bite. 14
Although the same financial and structural consequences can flow from civil or administrative enforcement actions, 15 some argue that the badge of a criminal conviction provides a deterrent effect that those procedures lack. 16 The label of criminality brings with it a public stigma for management that mere civil
or administrative liability does not. 17 This stigma may nudge corporations away
from courses of conduct that could bring corporate liability. 18 This expressive
mechanism of societal disapproval is similar to that of individual criminal prosecution, placing moral blame upon the bad actor. 19
This stigma also serves a retributive purpose, punishing the corporation for
wrongdoing. 20 However, many scholars are skeptical of the retributive justifications of corporate criminal prosecutions. Retributive theories of criminal justice presuppose a level of moral culpability as a justification for imposing punishment. 21 But because corporations are typically a collective body, pinpointing
the “mind” of a corporation in an effort to identify mens rea presents challenges
that do not arise in the prosecution of individuals. 22
Others point to decision-making mechanisms within the corporate structure
to argue that retributive goals are coherent with corporate punishment. 23 Because corporate decision making is the result of intentional choices that carry a
moral element, a mental state for any given decision can be imputed to a corporation. 24 The moral, ethical, and social guidelines to which corporations adhere

13. See Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra note 7, at 1240–41.
14. Id. But see Khanna, supra note 6, at 1534 (expressing doubt about such deterrent value).
15. See Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra note 7, at 1240–41.
16. Id. at 1242 (“[T]here is additional deterrent value associated with criminal charges
against corporations. Companies do not want to be labeled corporate criminals and therefore may
have more incentives to avoid criminal sanctions than otherwise comparable civil or administrative
sanctions.” (footnote omitted)).
17. See Khanna, supra note 6, at 1509 (“[T]here is no [reputational] rub-off effect if the corporation is found liable in civil court because civil cases are such common occurrences.”).
18. See Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra note 7, at 1242.
19. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J.
473, 500–03 (2006).
20. Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 833, 852–53 (2000).
21. See John T. Byam, Comment, The Economic Inefficiency of Corporate Criminal Liability, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 582, 583 (1982).
22. See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 4, at 320 (“Corporations are legal fictions, and legal
fictions cannot commit criminal acts. Nor can they possess mens rea . . . .”); Howard M. Friedman,
Some Reflections on the Corporation as Criminal Defendant, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173, 180
(1979).
23. See, e.g., Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra note 7, at 1248–50.
24. See, e.g., Denis G. Arnold, Corporate Moral Agency, 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 279,
281–82 (2006).
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in making a given decision can all provide evidence for the level of moral culpability in that decision. 25
Certain collateral consequences can flow from a corporation’s criminal
conviction that are not available sanctions in the realm of civil liability. Perhaps the most consequential 26 is debarment of government contractors from future contracting with the federal government. 27 Corporations may also be subject to loss of license to engage in certain activities. 28 This loss of license,
foreign to the civil and administrative sphere, suggests that novel collateral consequences may add further deterrent value.
Still, some commentators question how much deterrence corporate criminal
prosecution really affords. 29 Crucially, a corporation cannot be put in jail, unlike individuals. 30 The possibility of incarceration is one of the biggest reasons
not to engage in criminal activity. Yet this threat is entirely absent from the
corporation’s decision-making processes. In short, the argument goes, corporations simply do not care about criminal prosecutions in the same way that individuals do because of the impossibility of incarceration of the corporation itself.
Scholarship is divided on this point. On the one hand, the impact of reputational sanctions is speculative, and the impact of these sanctions lacks uniformity. 31 However, evidence indicates that reputational harms flowing from corporate criminal convictions can give rise to consequences heightened in or unique
to the criminal context. 32 These include disruption in customer relationships,
managerial and employee turnover, and cost outlays to prevent further commissions of similar crimes. 33
25. See Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra note 7, at 1249.
26. See David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the
Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1335 (2013) [hereinafter Uhlmann,
Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements].
27. See 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (2018) (instituting debarment as a sanction for criminal conviction under the Clean Water Act); see also RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND
SENTENCING § 1.9.2(c) (1994) (estimating that debarments and license suspensions were imposed
as a collateral consequence in twenty-five percent of government procurement cases and twenty
percent of government program fraud cases).
28. See Khanna, supra note 6, at 1497–99.
29. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think about the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359 (2009) (discussing the improper deterrent effect falling upon
shareholders who do not engage in the decision-making that could give rise to criminal liability);
Fischel & Sykes, supra note 4, at 324 (arguing through an economic framework that corporate criminal liability may create problems both of under- and over-deterrence); Khanna, supra note 6, at
1493–96.
30. See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 4, at 322 (“Of course, corporations may . . . lack the
resources to pay monetary penalties against them, but the alternative of incarceration is not available
for them.”).
31. See Khanna, supra note 6, at 1504–05 (“The use of reputation is nonetheless problematic, because reputational sanctions are inaccurate and affect only firms with good reputations.”).
32. See, e.g., Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate
Crime: Evidence, 42 J.L. & ECON. 489, 523 (1999).
33. Id.
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Finally, corporate criminal prosecutions can serve the purpose of promoting
the perception of fairness throughout the criminal justice system. In highprofile instances of corporate misconduct, public outcry has emerged when the
state declines to prosecute. 34 Uniform treatment of corporate and individual
criminal defendants bolsters the public’s perception of fairness within the criminal justice system. 35
This Note addresses the perceived shortcomings of criminal corporate prosecutions by adding a new collateral consequence to convictions: restrictions on
the corporate defendant’s ability to engage in electioneering. This policy reform would enhance the deterrent effect of corporate criminal prosecutions.
Likewise, it would engender feelings of fairness by creating a step towards
similar treatment of individual and corporate defendants in the criminal sphere.
B. Collateral Consequences for Criminal Convictions
For individuals, the criminal justice system has deterrent features beyond
the possibility of incarceration. Individuals routinely suffer collateral consequences even after they serve their sentences. For example, people convicted of
a crime 36 may face deportation post-conviction. 37 They may be forbidden from
owning a firearm. 38 They may be subject to no-contact orders. 39 They may
lose eligibility to receive government benefits. 40

34. See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265
(2014) (discussing anger at the lack of prosecutions following the 2008 financial collapse); Jed S.
Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-noexecutive-prosecutions/.
35. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra note 7, at 1268 (“We expect corporations to
meet their legal obligations, just as we expect individuals to do so; we must sanction corporate criminality just as we must sanction individual criminality.”).
36. Although the historical tendency has been to refer to such individuals with terms such as
“convict,” “felon,” or “offender,” this Note will eschew such terminology in an effort to keep to the
contemporary practice avoiding branding these individuals with a stigmatic badge. See generally
Karol Mason, Justice Dept. Agency to Alter its Terminology for Released Convicts, to Ease Reentry,
WASH. POST (May 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2016/05/04/
guest-post-justice-dept-to-alter-its-terminology-for-released-convicts-to-ease-reentry (describing a
Department of Justice policy shift in this direction).
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2018) (rendering deportable any alien convicted of certain
crimes).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018) (criminalizing the possession of firearms and ammunition for
individuals “convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year”).
39. See, e.g., Jones v. Alabama, No. 14-0059-WS-C, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88245 (S.D.
Ala. June 30, 2015); State v. Latham, Nos. A11-1930 and A11-1931, 2014 Minn. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 1204 (Nov. 24, 2014); Thatcher v. Thatcher, No. 22493-7-III, 2004 Wash. App. LEXIS
2361 (Oct. 19, 2004).
40. See Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 259 (2002).
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Perhaps the most severe collateral consequence for individuals who have
been convicted of a crime is the loss of voting rights. An overwhelming majority of states disenfranchise those convicted of a felony. 41 Prior felony convictions bar millions of Americans from voting—a 2016 study estimated the number to be about one in every forty adults in America, with the rate for African
Americans of voting age over four times higher. 42 Although criminal justice
reformers have fueled a movement to open avenues to restoration of voting
rights for convicted felons in many states, 43 the forfeiture of voting rights upon
conviction of a felony remains the norm for individuals all over in the United
States. 44
The legal justification for collateral consequences stems from the common
law. 45 In the English tradition, people suffered profound consequences following a criminal conviction. A conviction could trigger the forfeiture of rights
that are now thought to be fundamental, including the right to contract, marry,
and bring suit. 46 Post-conviction punishment was so harsh that it came to be
known as a “civil death.” 47 Although the American criminal justice system has
taken a step back from these severe common law traditions, it nonetheless im-

41. See Jean Chung, Felony Disenfranchisement: A Primer, SENTENCING PROJECT (July 17,
2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/felony-disenfranchisement-a-primer/. Note
that that these numbers were compiled before the recent passage of Amendment 4, a ballot measure
in Florida that could restore voting rights for over one million people with felony convictions.
Nadege Green, Florida Passes Amendment 4, Will Automatically Restore Right to Vote for Felons,
WLRN (Nov. 6, 2018), http://www.wlrn.org/post/florida-passes-amendment-4-will-automaticallyrestore-right-vote-felons. Currently, however, the number of people who will reobtain their voting
rights under Amendment 4 is unclear. See Karen Zraick, Florida Republicans Push to Make ExFelons Pay Fees Before They Can Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/03/20/us/florida-felon-voting-rights.html (describing the political fight over a Republicansponsored bill in the Florida legislature that would curtail the impact of Amendment 4).
42. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., SENTENCING PROJECT, 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS:
ESTIMATES
OF
FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT,
2016
(2016),
STATE-LEVEL
http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-state-level-estimates-felonydisenfranchisement-2016/. These numbers were also compiled before the passage of Amendment 4
in Florida. See Green, supra note 41.
43. Restoring the Right to Vote by State, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 19, 2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/restoring-right-vote-state (“Since 1997, twenty-three states
have made legislative or policy changes restoring the vote to at least some people with criminal
convictions or liberalizing the state’s clemency procedures.”). This was published prior to the passage of Amendment 4 in Florida, which represented a monumental development in the political
movement against felony disenfranchisement. See Green, supra note 41. However, the practice is
still commonplace elsewhere in the United States.
44. Chung, supra note 41, at 2 fig.A.
45. Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues
of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 478 (2010).
46. See id.; Alec C. Ewald, Civil Death: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1049 n.13.
47. Pinard, supra note 45, at 478.
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poses a number of collateral consequences that are arguably more punitive than
incarceration. 48
Collateral consequences from felony disenfranchisement to risk of deportation to loss of access to public benefits have all attracted considerable reasoned
critiques from commentators. 49 This Note does not endorse imposing these
consequences on individuals convicted of crimes. Nor does it take umbrage
with the moral, racial, sociological, and philosophical objections within these
critiques to the extent that they impact individuals differently than they do corporations. Instead, this Note argues that where a stringent system of collateral
consequences exists for individuals, it should be applied equitably to corporations convicted of criminal misconduct.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 50 the
notion of corporate personhood entered the popular conscience. Drawing upon
this idea, this Note argues that limits on corporate political activity following a
criminal conviction in the same way we restrict the political activity of those
convicted of a felony could address some of the shortfalls in election law that
critics of Citizens United have focused upon. These limits would better tailor
punishments towards deterrent goals and would combat popular perceptions that
corporations are subject to a different system of justice than are individuals.
II. ELECTIONEERING LIMITS AND CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
A. The Road to Citizens United and Money as Speech
Modern limits to electioneering find their genesis in the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Buckley v. Valeo. 51 Buckley presented a broad challenge to the 1971
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which included provisions capping
individual donations to campaigns 52 and banning corporate and union contributions outright. 53 Those challenging the law argued that regulating electioneering activity amounted to a regulation of political speech. Therefore, the law

48. See Chin, supra note 40, at 253 (“[C]ollateral consequences may be the most significant
penalties resulting from a criminal conviction.”); Colleen F. Shanahan, Significant Entanglements:
A Framework for the Civil Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387,
1394 (2012).
49. See generally Chin, supra note 40 (investigating the “covert” nature of these consequences’ impact); Pinard, supra note 45 (discussing the disproportionate racial impact of collateral
consequences on individuals convicted of a crime).
50. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
51. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
52. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 3, as amended by the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263, partially invalidated by Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
53. FECA § 610, invalidated by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam).
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needed to meet the exacting standards of strict scrutiny 54 to avoid violation of
the First Amendment. 55
The Court, in a 170-page per curiam opinion, upheld some parts of the law
and struck down others. 56 Perhaps most crucial, however, was the Court’s acceptance of the challengers’ argument that regulation of campaign contributions
implicated the First Amendment. 57 Because the Court found that political contributions facilitated political speech, contribution limits restricted political
speech itself. 58 Buckley opened the door for future challenges to campaign finance laws on First Amendment grounds. Dissenting in part, Justice White
made explicit the paradigm shift that the majority left unsaid: “money is
speech.” 59
Twenty-six years later, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act, commonly referred to as McCain-Feingold, enacting new restrictions on
campaign contributions. 60 In a five-to-four victory before the Supreme Court,
most of McCain-Feingold survived a 2003 facial challenge. 61 The justice who
provided the swing vote, Justice O’Connor, retired three years later. 62 Soon after, her replacement, Justice Alito, swung the Court’s majority view on campaign finance. In 2007, one of McCain-Feingold’s key provisions lost in an asapplied challenge before the Supreme Court. 63 The Court, however, could not
muster up a majority to declare the provision facially unconstitutional, so they
stopped short of overturning the 2003 decision. 64

54. See Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) (“The Equal Protection Clause requires that statutes affecting First Amendment interests be narrowly tailored to their legitimate objectives.”).
55. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 11 (“In appellants’ view, limiting the use of money for political
purposes constitutes a restriction on communication violative of the First Amendment, since virtually all meaningful political communications in the modern setting involve the expenditure of money.”).
56. Id. at 143.
57. Stuart McPhail, Remembering Buckley’s Mistakes, CITIZENS FOR RESP. AND ETHICS IN
WASHINGTON (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.citizensforethics.org/remembering-buckleys-mistakes/.
58. See Eugene Volokh, Money and Speech, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 24, 2010),
http://volokh.com/2010/01/24/money-and-speech-2/.
59. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 166 Stat. 81.
61. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). One provision of McCain-Feingold that the
Court upheld banned corporations from use of general treasury accounts to fund television and radio
ads during election season that urged viewers to vote for or oppose a candidate. The Court relied on
its ruling in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), in which it upheld the
constitutionality of a state law prohibition against corporations’ use of general treasury funds for
donations to campaigns for elected state office.
62. See Sandra Day O’Connor, First Woman on the Supreme Court, SUP. CT. U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/visiting/SandraDayOConnor.aspx (last visited Dec. 10, 2018).
63. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
64. Id. at 482 (“McConnell held that express advocacy of a candidate or his opponent by a
corporation shortly before an election may be prohibited, along with the functional equivalent of
such express advocacy. We have no occasion to revisit that determination today.”).
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B. The Citizens United Decision
When the Supreme Court first heard oral argument in Citizens United in
2009, the case presented an issue of campaign finance law that seemed unlikely
to have profound constitutional repercussions. 65 Counsel for the petitioners argued that Section 203 of McCain-Feingold, which prohibited corporations from
spending money from their general treasuries on electioneering, did not apply to
the commission of a politically-charged documentary. They pushed the Court
to resolve the case on purely statutory grounds, obviating the need to consider
the broader constitutionality of the law. 66 However, after an unexpected turn at
argument, the conservative wing of the Court signaled its openness to a constitutional attack on the law. 67 The Court set the case for rehearing, requesting
supplemental briefing on whether the Court’s prior decision regarding the constitutionality of corporate contribution limits should be overruled. 68
The Court agreed that corporations enjoy full First Amendment protections
in the realm of political speech. 69 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion leaned on
First Amendment precedent indicating that the government cannot determine
what speech is protected based on the identity of the speaker 70 to hold that the
very same protection applies to corporations. 71 The opinion echoed worries
voiced by Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Roberts in the first round of oral argument that allowing regulation of political speech could lead to an endpoint
where the government has an ability to censor the press, print media, and other
commonplace forms of communication. 72 The Court invalidated Section 203 of
McCain-Feingold outright, invalidated 2 U.S.C. § 441b’s ban on the use of corporate treasury funds for express advocacy, and overturned McConnell v.
FEC—the case that had upheld Section 203’s constitutionality just seven years
before. 73

65. See Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited: How Chief Justice John Roberts Orchestrated
the Citizens United Decision, NEW YORKER: ANNALS OF LAW (May 21, 2012),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/21/money-unlimited.
66. Id. (“[Citizens United’s counsel Theodore] Olson’s argument indicated that there was no
need for the Court to declare any part of the law unconstitutional, or even to address the First
Amendment implications of the case.”).
67. See id.
68. Lyle Denniston, Briefing Set on Citizens United Rehearing, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29,
2009, 2:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/06/briefing-set-on-citizens-united-rehear/.
69. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010).
70. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986); First Nat’l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978).
71. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342.
72. See id. at 337.
73. Id. at 365–66 (“Austin is overruled . . . . The McConnell court relied on the antidistortion
interest recognized in Austin to uphold a greater restriction on speech than the restriction upheld in
Austin . . . . This part of McConnell is now overruled.”) (internal citations omitted).
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On the other hand, Section 311 of McCain-Feingold survived Citizens United. 74 This provision contained the statute’s disclosure requirements for corporate political spending. It mandated that any non-candidate entity who funds a
televised electioneering communication must include a disclaimer identifying
the source of the funding. 75 The Court explained that disclosure requirements
do not prevent speech itself, and that the government had an interest in aiding
citizens in making informed choices in elections. 76 The Court also upheld
McCain-Feingold Section 201, which requires that large-money donors file a
disclosure statement with the FEC, 77 on similar grounds as McCain-Feingold
Section 311. 78
Some criticism of the Citizens United decision has focused on its treatment
of disclosure law. On the one hand, the decision ostensibly left undisturbed the
state of disclosure law by leaving the pertinent provisions of McCain-Feingold
intact. 79 However, the majority failed to address the FEC’s continued narrowing of what types of transactions are subject to disclosure. 80 As a result, only
those contributions specifically earmarked for election spending trigger disclosure requirements. 81 When Citizens United removed the shackles from the activities of SuperPACs, it opened the door to largescale donations to these
groups. Disclosure of these donations was not required by law unless given
with a specific directive to spend on an election. 82 Some commentators have
posited that many of the decision’s ill effects could be ameliorated through
heightening of the FEC’s interpretations of disclosure requirements. 83 However, partisan polarization among the six politically appointed Commissioners
seems to have sapped the political will necessary to create this change at the
FEC. 84

74. See id. at 367.
75. 52 U.S.C. § 30120(d)(2) (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441d(d)(2)).
76. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67.
77. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(1) (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1)).
78. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Symposium, The Disclosure Debates: The Regulatory Power of an Informed
Public, 38 VT. L. REV. 933, 937 (2013) [hereinafter Malloy] (statement by Tara Malloy, Senior
Counsel, Campaign Legal Center, criticizing this aspect of the Citizens United opinion).
81. See id.
82. See id. (“For example, if I were to give $100,000 to [a SuperPAC], and not earmark the
funds for anything, I [sic] would not have to be disclosed . . . as long as I was not foolish or honest
enough to say, ‘Please use my millions of dollars for an election ad that falls into the two legal categories.’ ”).
83. See, e.g., Citizens United, RADIOLAB PRESENTS MORE PERFECT (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/citizens-united/ (pertinent discussion from 53:56–56:33).
84. See id. (pertinent discussion from 56:34–1:00:24).
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C. Fallout of Citizens United and
Emerging Conceptions of Corporate Personhood
The Citizens United decision’s apparent treatment of the corporate form as a
legal person sparked widespread outcry. 85 The majority opinion carefully
stopped short of explicitly equating corporations and persons, often echoing
Section 441b’s language of “persons or group.” 86 Still, the Court placed individuals and corporations on equal footing when engaging in political speech. 87
This prompted populist pushback. Taken alongside Republican presidential
nominee Mitt Romney’s infamous assertion that “corporations are people, my
friend,” the case drew major attention during the 2012 presidential election cycle. 88 Scrutiny of the decision continues today. 89
Significant cracks in the armor of legal restrictions on corporate giving have
emerged as a consequence of Citizens United. The D.C. Circuit relied on Citizens United to invalidate caps on corporations’ donations to SuperPACs. 90 The
decision had major impacts on the 2012 presidential election, where large donors played key roles in bolstering candidates’ war chests. 91 The Supreme
Court has also invalidated attempts to use public funding to offset the advantage
of candidates who enjoy major financial support from large private donors. 92
Citizens United also left open questions about how far the comparison between the corporate entity and human persons might go. The majority opinion

85. See, e.g., Amanda D. Johnson, Originalism and Citizens United: The Struggle of Corporate Personhood, 7 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 187, 187 (2010); Jim Hightower, Fighting the Subversion of
Our People’s Sovereignty, TRUTHOUT (Feb. 26, 2010), http://truth-out.org/archive/component/k2/
item/88240:fighting-the-subversion-of-our-peoples-sovereignty.
86. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339, 366, 368 (2010). The dissenting justices explicitly use the term “personhood” in describing the majority’s conception of a corporation’s ability
to exercise free speech rights. Id. at 466 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 343 (“Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the
discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas that the First Amendment seeks
to foster. The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other
associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment.”) (majority opinion) (internal
citations omitted).
88. See, e.g., Justin Elliott, Why Mitt Romney Was Right about Corporations, SALON (Aug.
13, 2011, 6:01 PM), https://www.salon.com/2011/08/13/corporate_personhood/; John Light, Where
do the Candidates Stand on Citizens United?, MOYERS & COMPANY (Oct. 19, 2012),
http://billmoyers.com/2012/10/19/where-do-the-candidates-stand-on-citizens-united/.
89. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, If Corporations Are People, They Should Act Like It,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 1, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/if-corporations-arepeople-they-should-act-like-it/385034/; Nina Totenberg, When Did Companies Become People?
Excavating the Legal Evolution, NPR (July 28, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/07/28/335288388/
when-did-companies-become-people-excavating-the-legal-evolution.
90. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
91. Toobin, supra note 65 (“Sheldon Adelson, the gambling entrepreneur, gave about fifteen
million dollars to support Newt Gingrich, and Foster Friess, a Wyoming financier, donated almost
two million dollars to Rick Santorum’s Super PAC. Karl Rove organized a Super PAC that has
raised about thirty million dollars in the past several months for use in support of Republicans.”).
92. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 727–28 (2011).
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gave little guidance as to what rights corporations might enjoy under a personhood theory outside of the context of campaign contributions. 93 In its aftermath, some worried that the case might provide ammunition for overruling the
ban on direct corporate donations to political candidates (as opposed to funding
electioneering communications, which was at issue in Citizens United). 94 To
date, this has not occurred—at least one district court has explicitly declined to
extend the rule of Citizens United to invalidate the ban on direct corporate electoral donations, 95 and another district court that relied on Citizens United to invalidate the ban was reversed on appeal. 96 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
recognized that Citizens United does not alter the propriety of limiting corporate
electioneering when the purpose behind such regulation is to prevent corruption
or the appearance thereof. 97
What’s more, Citizens United could lay the foundation for corporations to
assert new rights divorced from the campaign finance context. Commentary on
this possibility has ensued since the ruling in Citizens United. 98 And in 2014,
the Supreme Court seemed to recognize the possibility in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. There, the Court held that the Affordable Care Act could not
require Hobby Lobby to provide health plans that covered contraception because it impermissibly burdened the corporation’s religious freedom. 99
This attempt to expand corporate personhood likewise reaches the criminal
context. 100 In 2015, the Third Circuit rejected a claim that a corporation was
93. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND THEY SHOULD
ACT LIKE IT) 60 (Yale Univ. Press 2018) (“The Citizens United opinion . . . does not reveal deep
thought about when corporations should have rights.”).
94. See, e.g., Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ineluctable Question of Corporate
Citizenship, 44 CONN. L. REV. 575, 577–78 n.3 (2012) (“Citizens United may well prompt recognition of even broader corporate political rights.”).
95. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1133 (D.
Minn. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 692 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2012).
96. United States v. Danielczyk, 788 F. Supp. 2d 472, 493–94 (E.D. Va. 2011) (relying on
Citizens United to invalidate Section 441b(a) of FECA), rev’d, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012).
97. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 187 (2014) (“This Court has identified only one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.”). In this analysis the Court leans heavily on the analysis in Davis v. FEC,
554 U.S. 724 (2008).
98. See, e.g., Sepinwall, supra note 94, at 577–78 n.3; Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The Humanization of the Corporate Entity: Changing Views of Corporate Criminal Liability in the Wake of Citizens United, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 40 (2010).
99. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 682 (2014). Although the Hobby
Lobby majority did not directly cite Citizens United, each case deals with the ability of a corporation
to assert constitutional rights in novel ways. Numerous commentators have compared the two in
significant detail. See generally, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 96–104 (2014); David Rosenberg, The Corporate Paradox of Citizens
United and Hobby Lobby, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 308 (2016); Ryan Azad, Comment, Can a
Tailor Mend the Analytical Hole? A Framework for Understanding Corporate Constitutional
Rights, 64 UCLA L. REV. 452, 452–67 (2017).
100. The phenomenon of corporations asserting constitutional rights meant to constrain the
activities of law enforcement is not entirely new. For instance, the Supreme Court held nearly a cen-
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entitled to a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination before a
grand jury subpoena. 101 This attempt found its grounding partially in the expanded corporate rights granted by the Citizens United and Hobby Lobby decisions. 102 A number of circuits ruled prior to Citizens United that a corporation
may have a Sixth Amendment right to jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings, but the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue. 103
Other commentators have suggested that the relationship between the First
Amendment and the Fourth Amendment might give rise to another extension of
corporate rights. One conception of the Fourth Amendment is protection
against intrusions on activities associated with freedom of thought. 104 Coupled
with the language in Citizens United about the right of corporations to engage in
the “marketplace of ideas,” 105 the possibility of increased corporate Fourth
Amendment protections may be viable. 106 Remarkably, one scholar has asserted that the case law granting corporations constitutional rights like those of individuals would not be inconsistent with a corporation asserting a Second
Amendment right to take up arms. 107
Beyond the effects that Citizens United has had on the constitutional rights
of corporations outside of the context of election law, there may be subtle effects in doctrine that alter the course of corporate criminal prosecutions. In the

tury ago that corporations enjoy at least some protections against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920) (“[T]he rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected . . . .”).
Still, assertions of novel conceptions of corporate rights may be accelerating in the wake of Citizens
United, as this discussion details. And, scholars and commentators have looked to corporate personhood jurisprudence following Citizens United in imagining how those rights may change going forward. See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 93, at 74–81 (discussing the history and trajectory of corporate criminal procedure rights).
101. In re Grand Jury Empaneled on May 9, 2014, 786 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2015) [hereinafter
Grand Jury Case]. The Supreme Court has recognized an individual’s Fifth Amendment right to
avoid compulsion to testify before a grand jury. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443–44
(1972). However, this prohibition is not absolute. See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542
U.S. 177, 189–90 (2004) (“The Fifth Amendment prohibits only compelled testimony that is incriminating . . . . Suspects who have been granted immunity from prosecution may, therefore, be compelled to answer . . . .”).
102. Grand Jury Case, 786 F.3d at 261 n.1.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 663 (2d Cir.
1989); United States v. Troxler Hosiery Co., 681 F.2d 934, 935 n.1 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v.
R.L. Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 1971); see also Khanna, supra note 6, at 1518 (“[T]he
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial may, arguably, be available to corporate defendants.”).
104. See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 412–17 (2008).
105. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 474 (2010).
106. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Citizens United & Corporate & Human Crime, 14
GREEN BAG 2D 77, 82–84 (2010).
107. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Telling Stories of Shareholder Supremacy, 2009 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1049, 1075. But see GREENFIELD, supra note 93, at 67 (“The Second Amendment’s right to
bear arms is described as a ‘right of the people,’ . . . [but the] First Amendment, for example, says
that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech’ without limitation of such
right to persons.”).
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realm of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, the humanization of corporations implied in Citizens United may necessitate greater judicial
review to meet the fairness standards that courts operate under for human defendants. 108 Citizens United’s blending of the corporate form and personhood
may strengthen the rationale for prosecuting a corporation directly when in the
past it would have made more sense to prosecute individuals responsible for the
misconduct. 109
Citizens United represents a major step in the slow jurisprudential march
towards corporations claiming rights previously reserved for individuals. But it
raises the question: if corporations can reap the benefits of constitutional entitlements for individuals, should they not too face the consequences for misconduct that individuals experience? Legislators have ample room for creativity in
crafting proactive policy measures to constrain and deter corporate malfeasance
in the face of these growing rights.
A corporate analogue to individual felony disenfranchisement is an active
step that legislators could take against the growing trend allowing corporations
“to take advantage of the significant benefits of the corporate form . . . without
having to shoulder attendant fundamental responsibilities.” 110 The implementation of limits on electioneering as a collateral consequence of a corporation’s
criminal conviction would add deterrent teeth to corporate prosecutions that do
not exist today. Because the Court has consistently recognized that corporate
political speech can still be limited to prevent corruption, 111 this tool could permissibly exist against a post-Citizens United backdrop.
III. CRAFTING A CORPORATE ANALOGUE TO
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
A. Substance and Mechanics of Corporate Disenfranchisement
This Note proposes that corporations convicted of criminal conduct should
suffer collateral consequences analogous to individual criminal disenfranchisement. Just as individual disenfranchisement strips the right to vote from an individual convicted of a felony, 112 this reform would constrain the ability of a
corporation to effect change in the electoral process following a criminal conviction. The reform would therefore constitute a step towards similar treatment
of individuals and corporations in the world of criminal prosecutions.

108. See Sheyn, supra note 98, at 39–41.
109. See Slobogin, supra note 106, at 78.
110. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1437 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Citizens United; Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014)).
111. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 187 (2014); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 737
(2008).
112. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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The core of the proposed reform would impose contribution limits on corporations that have been convicted of a crime. For this subset of corporations,
the reform would effectively reinstate the more generally applicable provision
of McCain-Feingold that the Supreme Court invalidated in Citizens United. 113
Another component of the reform would heighten the disclosure requirements imposed on contributions to SuperPACs by convicted corporations. Relying on Justice Louis Brandeis’s famous exhortation that sunlight provides the
best disinfectant, 114 these disclosure requirements would expose the concealed
links between criminally convicted corporations and organizations purposed
with influencing the electoral process. Such disclosure requirements would
provide a step towards making up for the gap in FEC-imposed disclosure requirements that have exacerbated the influx of obfuscated corporate money into
elections following the decision in Citizens United. 115
Corporate criminal disenfranchisement would attach upon conviction at trial
or upon the entry of a guilty plea. It would last for a prescribed length of time
as a condition of probation. The policy could also come as a term of a corporation’s deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement. The reform would
be permissive, not mandatory, in nature, so as to target those corporate criminal
defendants whom the policy would deter. 116
Corporate disenfranchisement would also be limited to a subset of prosecutions for criminal acts that engender corruption within the electoral system. The
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that corporate electoral speech can
be limited in furtherance of anticorruption. 117 Therefore, limiting the policy to
corporate crimes of this sort ensures that this punishment appropriately fits its
crime—that is, the policy represents a refined tool, not a blunt hammer.
B. Benefits of Corporate Criminal Disenfranchisement
Corporate criminal disenfranchisement would advance several goals of the
criminal justice system. First, the proposed reform would impose new collateral
consequences for a subset of corporate crimes, thereby responding to critiques
of corporate criminal prosecutions as lacking in real deterrence. Corporations
would care about the potential effects of disenfranchisement and would change

113. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 355–56 (2010).
114. Louis Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WKLY., Dec. 20, 1913 at 10.
115. See, e.g., Malloy, supra note 80, at 936–37.
116. A significant share of corporate criminal prosecutions targets small businesses. See
Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements, supra note 26, at 1326 n.193.
Therefore, to the degree that small businesses are less likely to engage in electioneering than large
corporations, this could limit the proper application of the proposed reform to a relatively modest
number of cases. Nonetheless, the reform is a worthwhile pursuit both because of the deterrent message sent to all corporations, along with its effect of bolstering the popular perception of fairness in
criminal corporate prosecutions.
117. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 187 (2014); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724,
737 (2008).
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their behavior as a result. Second, corporate disenfranchisement would strike a
tone of fairness throughout the broader criminal justice system. As corporations
have claimed more and more rights previously reserved for individuals, corporate disenfranchisement levels the playing field at least somewhat by imposing
upon corporations a collateral consequence analogous to restrictions that society
places upon convicted criminals’ ability to vote.
Commentators have called into question the true deterrent force of corporate
prosecutions. 118 Corporations cannot be jailed. Likewise, the stigmatic harm of
a criminal conviction may be less for corporations than for individuals because
their focus is on their financial bottom line. Some argue that, as a result, corporations care far more about the fines that flow from a criminal conviction than
about the conviction itself. 119
Introducing a novel collateral consequence to a corporation’s criminal conviction would change this calculus. Corporations that regularly engage in electioneering would experience greater deterrence from corporate disenfranchisement than they do under the current criminal justice regime. For instance, one
of the largest monetary penalties ever included in a corporate plea agreement
involved the Koch Petroleum Group. 120 The company is a subsidiary of Koch
Industries, which has a longstanding reputation as one of the most active corporate electioneering donors in the United States. 121 Corporate criminal disenfranchisement following its conviction could have dampened Koch’s subsequent electoral influence.
One might question whether corporate disenfranchisement would appreciably alter corporations’ behavior. After all, the limitations do not fall on the individuals that make up the corporation. In theory, members of the corporation
could circumvent the reach of the proposed reform by simply forming a new
entity and carrying on unaffected. However, such an endeavor would take time,
resources, and effort. Corporate disenfranchisement does not need to be entirely airtight and inescapable to drive behavior. If the reach of the policy can be
avoided, but only through inconvenient or costly means, it nonetheless has the
power to shift behavior.

118. See discussion supra Part I.A.
119. See Khanna, supra note 6, at 1500 (noting that some corporations may be unbothered by
reputational harms of criminal liability). A helpful illustration comes from the Securities and Exchange Commission rules informally known as the “Bad Boy” provisions. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d)
(2013). These provisions disqualify those convicted of a criminal securities violation from use of
certain capital accumulation safe harbors. Presumably, this adds deterrent effect to criminal liability
beyond mere stigmatic harm: corporations are better incentivized to avoid criminal violations of
securities laws when it could impact their future ability to raise capital.
120. Koch Pleads Guilty to Covering Up Environmental Violations at Texas Oil Refinery,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ENV’T AND NAT. RES. DIV. (Apr. 9, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/archive/
opa/pr/2001/April/153enrd.htm.
121. See Nicholas Confessore, Koch Brothers’ Budget of $889 Million for 2016 Is on Par
With Both Parties’ Spending, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/
us/politics/kochs-plan-to-spend-900-million-on-2016-campaign.html.
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Although one might anticipate strong corporate opposition to this reform,
there is reason to believe that some corporations would, in fact, support it. The
notion of corporate “hands-tying” rests on the idea that some corporations privately prefer not to engage in certain activities, yet nonetheless feel compelled
to participate. 122 Several rationales explain this desire to assimilate (e.g., gaining political capital, maintaining client relations, or building a specific public
image)—rationales that are just as compelling in the context of corporate electioneering. But if corporations could point to law eliminating or limiting their
discretion to do so, it provides cover for the corporation to pursue the course of
conduct it would have preferred in the first place. 123
Corporate criminal disenfranchisement would also send an important message about the criminal justice system that corporations must play by the same
rules as individuals. The outrage aimed at the lack of criminal prosecutions in
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis illustrated a popular perception that corporations operate with a degree of legal impunity unavailable to individuals. 124
Corporations’ increasing zeal for claiming rights traditionally reserved for individuals strikes a similar tone of unfairness. 125 Corporate disenfranchisement
would send a clear message in response—if corporations want to lay claim to
the benefits of personhood, they must accept this drawback of personhood in the
criminal context.
C. Anticipating Constitutional Objections to
Corporate Disenfranchisement
The First Amendment’s protection of the freedom of speech is a foundational principle of American civil society. 126 Accordingly, limits on speech
must survive serious review. And because this reform regulates political
speech, it must adhere to the requirements of Buckley and Citizens United. 127
The reform will have to advance both a compelling interest and be narrowly tailored toward that goal. 128 This is attainable. Properly tailored, corporate criminal disenfranchisement fits within the parameters of permissible regulations of
political speech that the Supreme Court has set forth.

122. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Hands-Tying and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
74 TEX. L. REV. 1813 (1996) (discussing this phenomenon).
123. See id.; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Hands-Tying Contracts: Book Publishing, Venture Capital Financing, and Secured Debt, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 628 (1992).
124. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 34.
125. See generally discussion supra Part II.B.
126. See, e.g., Benjamin Franklin, On Freedom of Speech and the Press, PA. GAZETTE, Nov.
1737, at 9 (“Freedom of speech is a principal pillar of a free government: when this support is taken
away, the Constitution is dissolved and tyranny is erected on its ruins.”).
127. See McPhail, supra note 57.
128. See Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972).
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Collateral consequences are a longstanding facet of our criminal justice system. 129 Individuals and corporations alike experience profound limitations on
various rights and freedoms stemming from criminal convictions. 130 Corporations in particular regularly face debarment when they have engaged in corrupt
behavior. 131 The right to contract, which debarment threatens to circumscribe,
is certainly fundamental, but it is not unlimited. 132
Collateral consequences of criminal convictions already entail a similar circumscription of constitutional rights. For example, individuals convicted of a
felony yield their Second Amendment right to possess firearms. 133 Those convicted of a domestic violence offense are subject to some limitations on their
First Amendment right to free speech in the form of no-contact court orders. 134
Specifically in the arena of corporate expenditures for the purpose of funding electioneering efforts, the Supreme Court has long recognized that limitations on corporate speech may survive searching First Amendment review
where a governmental interest in reducing corruption drives those limitations. 135
Stifling political speech as a means of preventing corruption or the appearance
thereof remains constitutionally permissible even post-Citizens United. 136
Criminal laws prohibiting graft, bribery, and the like do precisely this. 137

129. See discussion supra Part I.B.
130. See discussion supra Part I.B. And, note that courts routinely view some constitutional
rights as more protective of the interests of individuals than of corporations. See GREENFIELD, supra
note 93, at 21 (pointing to courts’ treatment of forced corporate disclosure in securities law and in
the law surrounding Freedom of Information Act requests, and arguing that laws demanding the
same disclosures from individuals would violate the First Amendment); cf. id. at 135 (“Requirements that corporations disclose financial and other information material to those who engage with
them, for example, should be unassailable even if such requirements might be constitutionally problematic if applied to natural persons.”). Since individual disenfranchisement is constitutionally permissible, perhaps courts would have little reason to frown upon analogous treatment of corporations.
131. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
132. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911)
(“[F]reedom of contract is a qualified and not an absolute right.”).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018) (criminalizing the possession of firearms and ammunition for
individuals “convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year”); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (invalidating a District
of Columbia statute banning handgun possession, but noting that “nothing in our opinion should be
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.”).
134. See, e.g., Jones v. Alabama, No. 14-0059-WS-C, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88245 (S.D.
Ala. June 30, 2015); State v. Latham, Nos. A11-1930 and A11-1931, 2014 Minn. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 1204 (Nov. 24, 2014); Thatcher v. Thatcher, No. 22493-7-III, 2004 Wash. App. LEXIS
2361 (Oct. 19, 2004).
135. See FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985)
(“[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling
government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances.”).
136. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 187 (2014).
137. See id. at 206–08 (discussing the types of quid pro quo corruption where prevention of
which may be a permissible basis for limiting speech); see also Dave Denison, Zephyr Teachout:
We’re Mired in Corruption, BAFFLER (Jan. 27, 2017), https://thebaffler.com/latest/zephyr-teachout-

400

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

[Vol. 8:381

Therefore, imposing corporate disenfranchisement upon a company that has
broken these types of laws falls squarely within the permissible regulation of
speech that the Court has long allowed.
In one key passage of its opinion, the Citizens United Court is quick to
equate “citizens” and “associations of citizens” for the purpose of First
Amendment analysis. 138 The court leans on this logic to equate protection of
the rights of individual speech with protection of the rights of corporate
speech. 139 Implicit in this analogue is the function of the corporate governance
structure as a mechanism of translation for individual speech: when corporations speak, they are simply manifesting the speech of their individual members.
However, in the context of corporate crime, this logic breaks down. If the corporation’s system of governance has allowed for or facilitated the commission
of a crime, perhaps that structure has crucial flaws. If that is the case, then
equating a corporation’s speech to an amalgamation or translation of its members’ speech is illogical, and the need for robust First Amendment protections is
less apparent.
Even if the forcible imposition of corporate disenfranchisement upon conviction were to run afoul of the First Amendment, the same result could perhaps
permissibly emerge through plea bargains, deferred-prosecution agreements,
and non-prosecution agreements. The consensual nature of these agreements
could avoid some constitutional hurdles. However, given the significant criticism of deferred- and non-prosecution agreements, this technique is not ideal. 140
Concerns of coercion that exist around these agreements would be even greater
when First Amendment protections are implicated. 141
CONCLUSION
Citizens United changed the face of corporate citizenship. Conceptions of
corporate personhood following the decision have extended well beyond the
realm of political speech and election law. The possibility that this extension
may soon reach the world of corporate criminal prosecutions cannot be ignored.
Accordingly, if corporations continue the trend of claiming individual rights,

corruption-denison (“[T]he way in which [the framers of the Constitution] would use the word bribe
is somewhat different than you might use the word bribe now. Bribery did not typically in their
conversation refer to a particular criminal law statute. . . . What they meant was taking money for
influence.”).
138. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010) (“If the First Amendment has any
force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply
engaging in political speech.”).
139. Id.
140. For examples of such criticism, see generally Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra
note 7; Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements, supra note 26.
141. See, e.g., Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements, supra note
26, at 1342.
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they should also be subject to the drawbacks individuals face in claiming those
rights.
The decision seems to be here to stay. Still, policymakers can take Citizens
United as an opportunity to devise creative new incentives for corporate behavior, rather than treat it as the tombstone of all corporate regulation. Corporate
disenfranchisement presents such a policy measure that alleviates election law
shortfalls in the wake of Citizens United, bolsters fairness in the criminal justice
system, and steers corporate behavior in a positive direction.
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